GUNS, KNIVES, AND SWORDS: Policing a Heavily Armed Arizona
The story reported that, "[flor the third straight year, Arizona was ranked [the] best state in the nation for gun owners by Guns & Ammo magazine, which praised the state's self-defense and carry laws, its shooting sports and strong gun culture." 3 The balance of the article considered the well-worn debate between gun rights advocates and gun control advocates reflected in the story's title: was this ranking to be hailed as a victory for the Second Amendment and responsible gun ownership, or denounced as the reason why "Arizona is the best state for criminals to get access to guns"? 4 Two things remain unchanged in 2019. First, this aspect of the gun debate remains as intractable as ever. 5 Second, Arizona remains among the most friendly states in the nation for firearms.' In 2018, Guns & Ammo ranked Arizona the best state in the nation for firearms for the fifth straight year, owing largely to its uniquely permissive concealed carry gun laws. ' The state allows Arizonans to carry concealed firearms in public, without a permit, in more places and with higher capacity magazines than anywhere else in the [https://perma.cc/AN2B-SXYD] (ranking Arizona first in the nation for guns in an environment where, "for the past six years ... most states moved steadily in a pro-gun direction").
7.
Id. ("An effort to weaken Arizona's firearm law preemption statute was defeated this session, keeping the state at the number one position in our survey for the fifth straight year.").
nation. 8 And a greater percentage of Arizonans carry concealed weapons on their person in public than virtually any other state. 9 This Article does not wade into the overarching debate about whether these facts give cause for celebration or concern. Instead, it explores a littlediscussed byproduct of Arizona's concealed carry laws: the increasing difficulties faced by Arizona law enforcement in protecting such a heavily armed populace. In particular, the Article considers what constitutes "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity to initiate an investigatory stop and protective frisk under Terry v. Ohio alone as indicative of criminal activity sufficient to justify a stop, they still have a duty to protect innocent citizens from armed criminals. The fact that Arizona's "gun laws . . . make it easy for criminals to get their hands on guns" only complicates this duty.1 3 Under Terry and its progeny, a police officer may "seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons" if the officer has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." This "stop and frisk" standard contemplates a two-pronged analysis: an officer may (1) seize an individual for a brief investigatory stop upon "reasonable suspicion that the suspect was involved in, or is about to be involved in, criminal activity," and (2) frisk the outer clothing of the individual for weapons if she has "reason to believe that [s] he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual."
This "reasonable suspicion" standard is "considerably less than proof . . . by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause."" Arizona courts have reaffirmed repeatedly not only the low threshold for reasonable suspicion," but also the great deference afforded to officers in making this determination.
But Arizona's public carry laws, enacted in 2010, present a direct challenge to the once widely held "assumption that a person carrying a concealed weapon was engaged in the crime of unlawful weapons possession," thus justifying a stop under the first Terry prong.' 9 Moreover, the once "nearly unanimous agreement that to be armed was to be dangerous," giving officers the right to frisk armed individuals under Terry's second prong, seems outdated in a state where the government's clear intent is to allow its citizens to lawfully and peacefully carry concealed weapons. 
POLICING A HEA VILY ARMED ARIZONA
Within that context, this Article explores three distinct aspects of Arizona law and policy complicating this growing tension between increasingly permissive "right to carry" laws in Arizona and the obligation of officers to safely conduct investigative stops and searches.
First, Section I of the Article examines not only Arizona's permissive concealed carry firearms laws but also its uniquely permissive knife laws. In 2010, Arizona became the first state in the country to broadly legalize the open and concealed public carry of any knife or "blade" regardless of size, function, or lethality.
2 ' It concurrently became the first state in the nation to prohibit local municipalities from restricting or otherwise regulating the sale, possession, or transfer of blades.
22 These all-encompassing permissive concealed weapons possession laws have directly contributed to the public "arming of Arizona."
Second, Section II of the Article considers the fact that weapons possession alone in Arizona can no longer give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity under the Fourth Amendment, and Arizona's attempt to nonetheless authorize law enforcement to investigate armed citizens. In particular, it questions the constitutionality and efficacy of Arizona's socalled "duty to inform" law, which requires concealed carry permit holders to affirmatively disclose their status to police officers when approached and provide their permit and identification at an officer's request. 23 As a matter of federal constitutional law, officers can only require citizens to cooperate with inquiries if reasonable suspicion already existed to justify the stop.
2 4 In contrast, by requiring citizens to voluntarily disclose information to officers, "duty to inform" laws arguably place these encounters with law enforcement outside the Terry stop context, thus failing to solve the reasonable suspicion issue. 25 Third, the Article considers the impact of competing decisions in Arizona and the Ninth Circuit concerning whether an armed individual in public is per se dangerous and thus subject to a frisk under Terry's second prong. The Article concludes by articulating policy considerations pointing to a modified categorical approach to frisking armed Arizonans, wherein known firearms possessors are subject to an automatic protective frisk for officer safety, while possessors of knives or other weapons may be searched only where circumstances so require it.
3 1 The Article draws upon the parallels of the firearms experience and borrows from tort law to advocate for a balanced risk-assessment approach to the seizure of knives during an investigatory stop in Arizona. This inherently flexible approach both reflects the spirit of the "reasonableness" approach embodied in Terry and the text of the Fourth Amendment, and offers a balance between the significant rights of armed Arizonans and the solemn obligations of the state's police officers. 32 Arizona became only the third state (after Alaska and Vermont) to allow the public concealed carry of a firearm without a permit. 33 That same day, and to much less fanfare, Governor Brewer signed a first-in-the-nation "knife preemption" law, the effect of which was to strip local municipalities of the ability to regulate knives and other blades and to broadly legalize without restriction the public carry of any "cutting instrument." 34 Not surprisingly, these permissive weapons laws have significantly aided the arming of Arizona. While firearms statistics are notoriously difficult to validate, 3 5 particularly in states like Arizona that do not require firearms registration or the application for a concealed carry permit, numerous studies rank Arizona as one of the most heavily armed states in the country.
36 A CBS News study found that nearly one in three Arizonans own a firearm, 37 and a Pew Research Center study on gun ownership noted that approximately twothirds of all gun owners own more than one gun. 38 Moreover, despite rescinding the need to maintain a concealed carry weapons (CCW) permit, Arizona has issued 325,421 active CCW permits-one for every twenty-two Arizonans. 3 9 These sweeping changes in the law, coupled with the increase in public carry of weapons, has created legal and logistical challenges for law enforcement in Arizona. Police officers are charged, first and foremost, with maintaining the safety and security of citizens in public, and a significant aspect of maintaining that safety is identifying individuals carrying weapons who have the power the injure themselves or others. But officers may not simply stop and disarm anyone carrying a gun or knife under the guise of protecting the public." Under the post-Terry Fourth Amendment, officers may only stop, detain, and search someone if they have reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal conduct." In Arizona, where public carry of virtually any weapon by virtually anyone is legal and affirmatively protected by statute, possession of a weapon alone does not sufficiently suggest criminal behavior to justify a stop. This reality leaves Arizona police officers in the unenviable position of divining which armed Arizonans are criminal threats to public safety and which are merely exercising their rights to public carry.
This section outlines the history of Arizona's evolution from a heavily regulated public carry state to a "constitutional carry" state, including the major legal challenges defining the contours of Arizona's weapons laws along the way. The section first briefly sketches the national trend towards permissive concealed carry laws and then places Arizona's concealed carry history within that broader context. It then discusses Arizona's uniquely permissive knife laws and the impact these laws have had on national lobbying efforts to deregulate blades. In doing so, this section implicitly diagnoses the "problem" facing police as they attempt to maintain safety and order on Arizona's streets and roadways. [https://perma.cc/7CNT-9Q69] (noting that "constitutional carry" is sometimes referred to as "Vermont carry" because Vermont for decades was the only state in the country that did not require a permit to carry a concealed firearm in public).
Shall Issue: State law requires a license to carry a concealed firearm in public, but the granting of such licenses is nondiscretionary and subject only to meeting determinate criteria set forth in the law.
52
May Issue: State law requires a license to carry a concealed firearm in public and provides the issuing entity with discretion over the issuance of a permit. 53 This discretion varies significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
No Issue: State law does not allow any private citizen to carry a concealed handgun in public, with very few limited exceptions.
As recently as 1988, forty states either prohibited the public possession of firearms (sixteen "no issue" jurisdictions) or tightly regulated such possession (twenty-four "may issue" jurisdictions). 56 But by 1994, the year Arizona became a "shall issue" jurisdiction, over half of all states had either no or very few restrictions on concealed carry permitting.
As of 2015, every state and the District of Columbia allow the public concealed carry of firearms.
5 ' The vast majority of these states are now 52. See Enright, supra note 50, at 919-20 ("As the name suggests, shall-issue laws require the issuing authority to issue a permit to an applicant who meets delineated requirements. There is little to no discretion on the part of the issuing body."); see also 
18
[Ariz. St. L.J.
POLICING A HEA VILY ARMED ARIZONA
The delegates at the 1910 Arizona Constitutional Convention did adopt (and the people did ratify) a provision to the Arizona Constitution stating that, "[t]he right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself or the State shall not be impaired," but this right was anything but absolute. 63 Two alternative proposals expressly giving the legislature the right to regulate or prohibit concealed carry were narrowly rejected, arguably suggesting that the delegates intended to allow CCW. 4 Arizona gun rights advocates made this exact argument in State v. Moerman, a 1994 Arizona Court of Appeals case in which two defendants challenged their convictions for illegally possessing concealed handguns in public by claiming A.R.S. section 13-3102 violated the Arizona Constitution.
5 But the Court rejected the claim that "these 'rejected amendments' support Defendants' argument that the framers of the Arizona Constitution intended . . . to confer an absolute right to bear arms." 66 The Court observed that the adopted language itself provides a qualified right "in which 'the right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense ofhimself or the State shall not be impaired.'"' The Court also noted that, given the existence of a concealed carry ban prior to the adoption of the Arizona Constitution, "the framers could have rejected th 
See TIE RECORDS OF THE ARIZONA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1910 678 (John
S. Goff ed., 1991) (explaining that three alternative proposals were considered, including one that stated, in part, "But the legislature shall have the right to regulate the wearing of weapons to prevent crime," and another stating "The people shall have the right to bear arms for their safety and defense, but the legislature shall regulate the exercise of this right by law").
65. Moerman, 895 P.2d at 1020. 66. Id. at 1022. 67. Id. redundancy, or because they deemed it to be unnecessary."" The Court concluded with a full-throated defense of Arizona's concealed carry ban, citing with approval prior case law that A.R.S. section 13-3102 "was drafted to 'protect[] the public by preventing an individual from having on hand a deadly weapon of which the public is unaware, and which an individual may use in a sudden heat of passion."'69 In dissent, Judge Weisberg found a 1970 amendment to Arizona's CCW ban unconstitutionally vague. This amendment exempted from the ban weapons that were "carried in a belt holster which holster is . . . partially visible, or is carried in a scabbard or case designed for carrying weapons." 70 Judge Weisberg maintained that a "case designed for carrying weapons" arguably could include the "fanny-packs" in which the defendants kept their handguns, and suggested that "the legislature ought to require that the holster, scabbard, or case be readily identifiable as containing a weapon." 7 ' Thus, while dissenting from the opinion, Judge Weisberg actually advocated tighter restrictions than those contained in the existing statute.
Reflecting the changing attitudes about public gun possession in Arizona and throughout the country, reaction to the Moerman decision was swift and negative. Rather than taking Judge Weisberg's advice to more clearly restrict public gun possession, the Arizona Legislature enacted A.R.S. section 13-3112, creating the first concealed carry weapons permitting process in the state and exempting anyone from prosecution who obtained a permit.
72 This permitting process gave local authorities significant discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a permit, thus making Arizona a "may issue" jurisdiction, 73 but it nevertheless reflected a sea change in the public arming of Arizonans. Brewer, a longtime member of the National Rifle Association and the Arizona Rifle and Pistol Association, immediately set out to relax Arizona's gun laws." Six months after taking office, Governor Brewer signed Senate Bill 1113, allowing Arizonans to carry concealed guns in bars and restaurants as long as they did not consume alcohol, unless the business specifically posted a sign in accordance with Arizona law that guns are not permitted on the premises." She further expanded the right of CCW permit holders with Senate Bill 1168, which banned property owners from prohibiting the storage of firearms in locked vehicles parked on their lots."
Most significantly, however, was Governor Brewer's action on April 16, 2010, when she signed Senate Bill 1108 making it legal for anyone over the age of 21 to carry a concealed deadly weapon without a permit.
7 9 Overnight, Arizona went from a relatively strict "may issue" state to the third "constitutional carry" state in the nation, after Vermont and Alaska. " In 2013, Governor Brewer defended the law against attempts by municipalities to enact their own concealed carry regulations, signing into law a firearms preemption statute requiring all firearms regulation to happen at the state level. 83 In the same law, she expressly prohibited local governments from maintaining a list of citizens who possess a firearm." Both actions, while lauded by gun rights advocates, significantly limited the flexibility of local law enforcement in how they are able to handle firearms issues unique to their municipalities.
As reflected in the statistics above, the signing of this legislation not only helped promote an already-active gun culture in Arizona, but led to an increase in the number of concealed handguns carried in public. This dramatic change in Arizona law and culture led the influential gun rights group Guns & Ammo to rank Arizona as the "Best State for Gun Owners" in a 2014 study examining each state's gun possession laws, gun and ammunition purchase laws, self-defense laws, and availability and access to shooting sports. An effort to weaken Arizona's firearm law preemption statute was defeated this session, keeping the state at the number one position in our survey for the fifth straight year. Arizona receives 10 points across the board thanks to its permitless (and permitted) carry law, a strong preemption statute, excellent use-of-force laws, and a lack of restrictions on individual firearms and accessories. Beyond a great set of laws, Arizona has one of the most thriving shooting cultures in the nation, a factor that helps it maintain its spot at the top of our list. Anti-gun groups rank Arizona as the worst state in the nation in terms of gun laws; we say it's the best." 6
C. Heller and McDonald in Arizona
Governor Brewer's pronouncement that she was "protect[ing] the . . . rights of Arizona citizens"" by eliminating concealed permitting requirements was arguably buttressed by the United States Supreme Court's decision two years earlier in District of Columbia v. Heller." Prior to Heller, the Court had never expressly opined on the scope of the Second Amendment's protections for the individual right to "keep and bear arms" as opposed to the right of "well-regulated militias" to do so. 89 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia rejected the restrictive view that the Second Amendment only granted the people the right to form an armed militia. 90 Instead, he determined that the Amendment protected an individual right to keep and bear arms that included the right to self-defense with a firearm and the right to have a working firearm in the home. However, while the Court recognized that some important limitations existed on this right, it declined to define the contours of those limitations.
92
Litigation across the country immediately commenced in federal court over whether Heller protected the right to public open or concealed carry of firearms. In the Ninth Circuit, a three-judge panel considered California's broad prohibition against the open or concealed carriage of a handgun in public locations. 93 Relying on Heller, the panel found that "the Second Amendment does require that the states permit some form of carry for selfdefense outside the home," even if the Second Amendment does not "require[] the states to permit concealed carry."
94 After two years of contentious public controversy over the case, the Ninth Circuit reversed the panel's decision after a rehearing en banc, holding that "the Second Amendment does not protect, in any degree, the carrying of concealed firearms by members of the general public." Perhaps not surprisingly in a state protecting by statute the near absolute right to carry firearms in public-openly or concealed-Arizona state courts 
D. The Unique Case ofArizona's "Blade" Laws
Though less well-known and polarizing than the National Rifle Association and other gun rights advocacy groups, an active knife enthusiast community has also successfully lobbied Arizona and other states to enact increasingly permissive knife possession laws.' 0 3 Led by the American Knife & Tool Institute (AKTI),o' these groups fund lobbying efforts to loosen restrictions on public knife possession, to broaden the scope of "blades" permitted to be carried in public, and to remove knives and related instruments from lists of "prohibited deadly weapons" in state statutes.'
05 As of December 3, 2018, AKTI's "Legislation" page listed no fewer than eighteen pending bills sponsored at AKTI's request to loosen restrictions on One of the initiatives supported by AKTI and other knife rights groups is statewide preemption, wherein the state government would act as the sole authority on knife laws." 0 Taking the position that "knife owners should not be expected to know and understand knife laws in multiple . .. jurisdictions where they may travel within their own state," AKTI has successfully lobbied for knife preemption laws in eleven states, all since 2010."'
The first state to enact statewide knife preemption laws was Arizona." 2 In fact, Governor Brewer signed the nation's first knife preemption law on the same day that she signed Arizona's "constitutional carry" law, transforming the state indisputably into the most permissive public carry jurisdiction in the country with two strokes of the pen. 
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The enactment of this tapestry of laws broadly permitting the public concealed carry of knives and handguns stands as an unqualified victory for sporting enthusiasts and staunch Second Amendment advocates in Arizona. But these laws have complicated matters immeasurably for one prominent group of public weapons possessors: Arizona's police officers. Law enforcement personnel are charged with protecting the public by, among other things, identifying and neutralizing potentially dangerous individuals before they can commit violent acts against other citizens. But in a state that allows virtually all citizens to carry open or concealed lethal weapons in public, officers increasingly have difficulty discerning which public weapons possessors pose a dangerous criminal threat and which simply are exercising their statutory rights. The next two sections confront this growing problem, first by analyzing weapons possession through the "stop and frisk" lens, and then by exploring conflicting case law regarding when an officer should be allowed to search and disarm a public weapon carrier.
II. "REASONABLE SUSPICION" AND POLICING A HEAVILY ARMED

ARIZONA
For much of this nation's history, police investigative authority was curtailed largely by the Fourth Amendment's requirement that officers obtain a warrant based upon probable cause.' 24 But the Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio in 1968 radically shifted the focus of courts away from warrant requirements and towards whether officers were acting reasonably in their interactions with individuals.
2 5 Today, the "Terry stop," often known as a "stop and frisk," is a ubiquitous and pervasive police tactic requiring only a "reasonable suspicion" that an individual is engaged in criminal activity and is "armed and presently dangerous." 2 6 This broad expansion of police power forever altered the nature, scope, and number of law enforcement interactions with citizens.
See 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 261-62 (6th ed. 2013) (observing that the Warren Court criminal procedure cases of the late 1960s changed the focus of the Fourth Amendment from warrants based on probable cause to a "general Fourth Amendment standard of 'reasonableness"').
Id. ("[Terry]
provided the impetus, as well as the framework, for a move by the Supreme Court away from the proposition that 'warrantless searches are per se unreasonable,' to the competing view that the appropriate test of police conduct 'is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable."' (citations omitted)).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-30 (1968).
When the Court decided Terry in 1968, Arizona prohibited the public concealed possession of firearms.' 27 That prohibition continued, with some exceptions, until 2010.128 Thus, one can understand why an Arizona officer reasonably may have suspected criminal activity was afoot when she observed, discovered, or received a tip about an individual's possession of a firearm in public. That possession, by itself, was criminal.
2 9 This logic, combined with the once "nearly unanimous agreement that to be armed was to be dangerous," provided the necessary justification to conduct an automatic frisk of public gun possessors.130 But in Arizona's rapidly changing, gun-friendly deregulatory environment, these assumptions require reconsideration.
This section defines the contours of current stop and frisk jurisprudence, the problematic application of reasonable suspicion to a heavily armed Arizona populace, and the questionable efforts of the Arizona legislature to resolve this problem through its "duty to inform" laws.
A. The Stop and Frisk Paradigm
"The Fourth Amendment protects the right of people to be free from 'unreasonable searches and seizures.""1 While Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long focused on the warrant requirement, Terry shifted the Supreme Court away from the proposition that 'warrantless searches are per se unreasonable,' to the competing view that the appropriate test of police conduct 'is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.' 129. See Bellin, supra note 19, at 31 (describing the widely held "assumption that a person carrying a concealed weapon was engaged in the crime of unlawful weapons possession").
130. Wilkins, supra note 19, at 1170 (quoting Bellin, supra note 19, at 32) (describing the "blanket assumption of dangerousness" under which most officers and courts traditionally operated with respect to gun possessors).
131. reasonableness as an objective test from the officer's perspective: "would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?"' 34 Moreover, the Court found that an officer could initiate a search of a lawfully stopped suspect for "the protection of the police officer and others nearby," so long as it was "confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer." 3 5 Attempting to limit this expansion of police search power, the Court explained that this pat down of the outer clothing "by no means authorize[d] a search for contraband, evidentiary material, or anything else in the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest. Such a search is controlled by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and probable cause is essential."' 3 6 "Thus, Terry created a two-pronged" test.'
37 Each prong is analyzed separately; the satisfaction of one prong cannot serve as justification for the second prong. Under the first prong, an officer may stop an individual (the seizure) if she has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.' 3 8 Under the second prong, an officer may frisk the individual (the search) if she has reasonable suspicion that the person "is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others."' 39 Because these analyses are distinct, an officer may reasonably suspect a person is committing a crime but lack the requisite suspicion that the individual is armed and dangerous, and vice versa.' 134. Id. at 21-22 (citations omitted) (" [I]njustifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.... If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police."). "Terry allows a frisk only if two conditions are met: officers must reasonably suspect both that criminal activity is afoot and that the suspect is armed and dangerous.""' "Although a frisk is less intrusive than a full-body search, the Fourth Amendment prohibits any search of an individual unless the police have a reasonable belief' that the two Terry prongs have been met.' 42 A Terry "pat-down search" allows the police to "'pat[] down a suspect's outer clothing"' in a manner "limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the office or others nearby."' 4 3
Notably, Arizona courts have also emphasized the constitutional requirement that officers develop reasonable suspicion of criminal activity prior to conducting a frisk, even if the officer feels endangered by an armed individual's presence. For example, in State v. Serna, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and invalidated a frisk of an individual who was standing in the middle of the street at night.' 44 Although the officer observed a "bulge," the court emphasized the lack of a predicate to justify the search: "facts sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity."" Despite Arizona courts' respect for the distinct two-pronged analysis under Terry, the "reasonable suspicion" standard under either prong remains low in Arizona. 
B. Lawful Carry and Unlawful Stops
In the fifty years since Terry was decided in 1968, the United States Supreme Court has authorized a near-linear expansion of the permissible scope of the stop and frisk practice. While Terry involved an on-the-street stop of a would-be robber casing an establishment with a gun bulging from his coat, 156 since then the Court has upheld an officer's ability to frisk individuals stopped for minor traffic violations who are suspected of carrying weapons, " search car compartments within "the lunge area" of the stopped individual,' 5 arrest suspects for refusing to affirmatively identify themselves during a activity.' 7 Arizona courts have long held that "an officer's right to conduct a pat-down search should be predicated on the officer's right to initiate an investigative stop in the first instance."' 8 Indeed, to hold otherwise would be to subject all lawfully armed and law abiding Arizonans to random searches of their person and vehicles for merely exercising their statutory rights to carry weapons. This approach would untether the Fourth Amendment from its reasonable suspicion foundations and eviscerate Fourth Amendment protections for public weapons carriers.
C. Arizona's "Duty to Inform" Law
In an unrestricted or "constitutional carry" jurisdiction like Arizona, where no state limits exist on the right to carry firearms in public, officers cannot demonstrate reasonable suspicion of criminality based solely on firearm possession. 169. United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1559 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that to allow stops of all armed persons in a permissive concealed carry jurisdiction "would effectively eliminate Fourth Amendment protections for lawfully armed persons").
170. See Bellin, supra note 19, at 38-39 (discussing constitutional problems with "gunlicense inquiry" statutes).
example, an officer at a crowded and heated protest rally would certainly want to know whether one of the more agitated participants was armed. Moreover, an officer would be keenly interested in knowing whether a convicted felon or a minor-both prohibited firearms possessors under Arizona and federal law-were in possession of a firearm. But without independent reasonable suspicion of criminality to detain and question the individuals, how can an officer gain this information?
Arizona has attempted to solve this issue by giving law enforcement greater authority to investigate the presence and lawfulness of public weapons possession."' A.R.S. section 13-3102 authorizes police officers to inquire whether an individual "is carrying a concealed deadly weapon," whether or not the officer has any suspicion that the individual has committed or is committing a crime.' 72 In fact, "failing to accurately answer the officer" is itself a crime.
173 A corollary to this provision requires Arizona concealed carry permit holders to carry their permits with them and present them to officers upon request.17
In essence, Arizona has created a form of weapons-license inquiry mechanism whereby, as a condition of exercising concealed carry rights, possessors agree to disclose the presence of weapons (and permit licenses) to police officers upon request.'
5 Several other states have enacted similar "gun-license inquiry" laws, though most of these sister statutes go further than the Arizona law in that they require public gun possessors to affirmatively disclose the presence of firearms (and provide the relevant permit, where necessary) as soon as they are approached by a peace officer."' In contrast, Arizona only requires such disclosure if specifically asked by an officer."'
171.
See, e.g., id. at 29 (discussing legislation in Georgia authorizing police officers to ask for documents confirming lawfulness of gun possession). Bellin, supra note 19, at 38-39. 176. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.07(A) (2019) (requiring permit information to be entered into a database "so that the permit's existence and current status will be made known to law-enforcement personnel accessing the Network for investigative purposes."); WIs. STAT. § 175.60(12)(b) (2019) (providing for database that can be queried "to confirm that a license . . . 
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102(A)(1)(b) (2019).
Id.
Id. § 13-3112(A).
175.
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This approach makes sense as a matter of policy, as it allows officers to determine whether a safety issue exists in a sensitive location, such as a crowded mall, and respond accordingly. If an officer identifies an armed individual in a sensitive location, he can then inquire further about the individual's motives and ability to lawfully possess the weapon.17
But this sound policy does not solve the constitutional issue surrounding stops of lawful weapons carriers. Rather, this duty to inform law raises serious constitutional questions in its own right. Under a traditional Terry analysis, an officer must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to initiate an investigative seizure.'
79 While an officer can ask an armed individual any question he wants-including whether he has a concealed carry permit-that individual has every constitutional right not to answer unless that individual has been constitutionally "seized." That seizure is only permissible if the officer has individualized reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In other words, an arrest for failure to present a concealed carry permit can only be upheld as long as the stop was "justified at its inception" and the request for information "has an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop." ' Thus, under existing precedent, these weapons-possession inquiries can only survive constitutional scrutiny if the officer had some independent, lawful reason to initiate the Terry stop. If the police cannot constitutionally require weapons carriers to disclose their carriage of weapons, officers cannot consider a failure to respond to a voluntary possession inquiry as a basis for reasonable suspicion.' ; see also Bellin, supra note 19, at 40 ("Gun-license-inquiry provisions purport to authorize police to request a license prior to the officer's development of 'reasonable suspicion' to suspect a gun carrier of any offense. The proper analogy would be to a police officer pulling over a driver who had not violated any traffic law and asking the driver to produce a license .... ).
181. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that without "at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed . . . stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license . . . [is] unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment"); Bellin, supra note 19, at 39-40.
Thus, Arizona's duty to inform law only has teeth to the extent that individuals consent to the officer's questioning. But while a police officer is free to approach individuals and ask questions absent reasonable suspicion, individuals are free to refuse to cooperate.' 82 But in a "weapon possession inquiry" state like Arizona, would not refusal to cooperate indicate unlawful weapons possession as a matter of logic, at least where the officer knows the individual is armed? Such a scenario seems likely in a gun-license inquiry regime, but it would also turn Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on its head. "[A] refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure."183 But in a jurisdiction where every law-abiding gun carrier has consented to cooperate with authorities, it would appear that an individual's refusal to cooperate, without more, would create reasonable suspicion of unlawful weapons possession."8
These duty-to-inform laws seem particularly ill-suited in "constitutional carry" states like Arizona, where virtually no restrictions exist on the right to carry concealed guns and knives. Even if an individual answers "yes" to an innocent officer's inquiry as part of a consensual encounter, what pertinent information does that answer reasonably furnish in a state where concealed possession without a permit is legal? Unlike "may issue" and "shall issue" states requiring concealed carry permit applicants to contract with the state to furnish their permits to officer's upon request to confirm the lawfulness of their possession, Arizonans' lawfulness to possess generates from their presence in the state.
III. DOES ARMED EQUAL DANGEROUS IN ARIZONA?
As the previous section illustrates, when the Arizona legislature "decided its citizens may be entrusted with firearms on public streets," Arizona police lost the authority initiate Terry stops based on nothing more than suspicion of weapons possession.11 But once a lawful Terry stop has been initiated, what level of reasonable suspicion is necessary to initiate a frisk? Must the officer determine through "specific and articulable facts" that the suspect is not only armed, but also dangerous?'. Can the officer simply rely on the actual or suspected presence of a weapon to conclude that the individual is "armed, and thus dangerous?"'"' And does the analysis change whether the weapon is a firearm or a knife?
The following section considers the contradictory answers provided to these questions by the Ninth Circuit, the Arizona Supreme Court, and other jurisdictions. The court justified its decision by emphasizing both the purpose of a Terry frisk and the unique circumstances of the case at hand. The court observed that:
A. Ninth Circuit
Terry explained that a search for weapons is justified by the "immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him"......
[I]t would be "clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical
harm."196
On its face, this reasoning appears to eliminate entirely the first prong of Terry. Officer Ferragamo did not need reasonable suspicion that Orman was engaged in criminal activity to stop and frisk him because Ferragamo reasonably suspected Orman was armed, which "is all that is required." This reasoning would appear to render Terry's longstanding two-pronged test into a disjunctive inquiry: an officer can stop someone if reasonable suspicion exists that criminal activity is afoot, or an officer can frisk someone (which necessarily entails a "stop") if reasonable suspicion exists that the person is armed.
The court also attempted to justify its troubling result by emphasizing that Officer Ferragamo's quick retrieval of the weapon was far less "intrusive" than a traditional frisk pat-down, and that the gun was readily accessible to Orman as Ferragamo stood "only inches" away. In its truncated analysis, the Ninth Circuit failed to discuss whether Orman was "presently dangerous" when frisked by Ferragamo.
2 0 1 Terry states that an officer can frisk an individual only if reasonable suspicion exists that the suspect is armed and presently dangerous, suggesting that the possession of a weapon alone may not justify a protective frisk.
202 The court's broad language that "carrying a gun" is all that is required to justify a search seems to create a categorical approach, at least as to firearms: if you are in possession of a firearm, you are necessarily and presently dangerous.
203
One final aspect of the case may explain the logic behind the court's puzzling decision, at least partially. The encounter preceding the frisk was consensual; thus, Officer Ferragamo did not need reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to initiate the questioning of Orman.
204 But whether an officer needs suspicion of criminal activity to start questioning someone is quite different from whether the officer needs suspicion that the individual is "armed and presently dangerous" to initiate a frisk. The Arizona Supreme Court directly addressed this issue in 2014. the pair they separated, and the officers pulled their car up next to Serna. 20 6 When the Officer Richey called to Serna, he walked over to the patrol car and was "very cooperative and polite" during the brief conversation. 20 7 Officer Richey then noticed a bulge on Serna's waistband and asked if he was carrying firearms. 20 8 Serna replied that he had a gun, at which point both officers ordered Serna to put his hands on his head while Officer Richey removed the gun from Serna's person. 209 When Serna later admitted he had a felony conviction, the officers arrested him as a prohibited possessor of a firearm.
10
Serna moved to suppress the firearm as illegally obtained evidence under the Fourth Amendment.
2 1 ' When the case reached the Arizona Supreme Court in 2014, two critical issues faced the court. First, the Court considered " [w] hether an officer must possess reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot in order to frisk an individual." 2 12 Second, it explored whether, even if an officer has no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the mere fact that an individual was armed was sufficient under Terry's second prong to initiate a protective frisk.
213
As to the first issue, the Court emphatically (and correctly) said yes, reaffirming the distinct, conjunctive two-pronged approach in Terry. a stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed and dangerous."217 The Court relied heavily on the concurrence of Justice Harlan in Terry explaining why independent reasonable suspicion was required for a protective frisk:
[I]f the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. Any person, including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous. If and when a policeman has a right instead to disarm such a person for his own protection, he must first have a right not to avoid him but to be in his presence. That right must be more than the liberty (again, possessed by every citizen) to address questions to other persons, for ordinarily the person addressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away; he certainly need not submit to a frisk for the questioner's protection. I would make it perfectly clear that the right to frisk . . . depends on the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime.
218
As to the second issue, whether an armed individual is per se dangerous for purposes of a Terry frisk, the Court answered no. 219 Robinson. 22 5 A significant flaw in this reasoning exists, however, in that it assumes all lawful activity is necessarily not dangerous. By claiming that Arizona's permission for citizens to carry weapons negates the dangerousness of those citizens, the Serna Court ignores the inherent dangerousness of weapons-especially firearms-even when handled properly by law abiding individuals.
22 6 While the Court correctly observed that the broad permission granted Arizonans to lawfully possess weapons negates the automatic conclusion that such possession is indicative of unlawful behavior, it fails to address the fact that lawful possession can nonetheless be dangerous.
Of course, many lawful activities are dangerous. Driving a car is among the most dangerous activities widely engaged in by a majority of citizens, but that does not give officers the right to stop all drivers-only the reckless ones. Or put differently, a firearm in the hands of a criminal intent on committing armed robbery certainly poses a greater danger than a firearm in the hands of a law-abiding citizen holstering the weapon for defensive protection. But that is precisely the point. An officer faced with the decision whether to frisk an armed individual under Terry's second prong has already reasonably determined that the individual is engaged in criminal activity. That determination alone raises the risk that the armed individual is dangerous.
For its part, the Serna Court did acknowledge this possibility, hypothesizing that, "[h]ad reasonable suspicion of criminal activity existed before the encounter or developed during the encounter, given that Serna was armed, the officer may have had grounds to frisk Serna." 227 But because the encounter between Serna and the officer was consensual, no right existed to conduct a frisk absent the development of reasonable suspicion to initiate an involuntarily stop. 22 8 This aspect of Serna reflects the limits of its holding: read narrowly, the case only applies to consensual encounters and does not answer the more difficult question of whether officers can automatically frisk and disarm weapons carriers in Arizona who have been lawfully stopped under Terry.
9
On that question, the Court offered conflicting signals. On the one hand, the Court seemed to imply that an officer needed only to develop reasonable suspicion that the lawfully stopped individual was armed. 230 But elsewhere in its opinion, the Court emphasizes the two-pronged inquiry contained within Terry's second prong: that an individual must not only be armed but also dangerous before an officer can frisk him. Whether and to what extent weapons possession could lead to a per se finding of dangerous-for example, when an individual possesses a high-capacity AR-15 in a crowd versus when an individual possesses a switchblade on an empty street-was left unanswered by the Court.
C. What About Nonconsensual Encounters?
Orman and Serna reached radically different conclusions on remarkably similar facts, only increasing confusion for Arizona officers deciding whether and when to frisk an armed individual. These cases suffer from another limitation: they both involved consensual encounters and did not directly address when an officer can frisk a lawfully and involuntarily stopped armed Arizonan.
2 3 ' Put another way, is a lawfully stopped armed individual automatically dangerous for purposes of Terry's second prong, or must an officer make an independent determination that the suspect is not only armed, but also dangerous? 
D. Policy Considerations for Guns and Knives
When carefully scrutinized, neither the "categorical" approach nor the "independent dangerousness" approach pass muster as a matter of law or policy. Particularly in a "constitutional carry" state like Arizona, where the concealed carry of all types of weapons is legal and ubiquitous, a more carefully tailored approach is needed to balance the rights of Arizonans to remain armed in public with the obligation of Arizona law enforcement to protect and serve.
The categorical approach ignores the wide array of circumstances in which an individual can be "armed," particularly in a knife-friendly state like Arizona. Terry states that an officer can conduct a protective frisk of a lawfully stopped individual if the officer has "reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual." 243 Clearly, then, a condition precedent to conducting a lawful frisk is the presence of a weapon.
24 4 If the individual is not "armed" (or at least if the officer lacks reasonable suspicion that he is armed), then the circumstance do not justify a frisk.
5
But armed with what? As Justice Brennan noted in Wright v. New Jersey, numerous everyday objects turn into "weapons" when put to appropriate use:
A "weapon" could include a brick, a baseball bat, a hammer, a broken bottle, a fishing knife, barbed wire, a knitting needle, a sharpened pencil, a riding crop, a jagged can, rope, a screw driver, an ice pick, a tire iron, garden shears, a pitch fork, a shovel, a length of chain, a penknife, a fork, metal pipe, a stick, etc. The foregoing only illustrate the variety of lawful objects which are often innocently possessed without wrongful intent. 246 With this admonition in mind, the categorical approach seems untenable. As Judge Wynn stated in his concurrence in Robinson, there is an "absurdity" to automatically collapsing the "'armed and dangerous' test into a single inquiry-regardless of the type of 'weapon' with which the detainee is 'armed.' 247 The categorical approach would authorize invasive frisks based on a bright-line formula of forcible stop + weapon = danger, even if the two inputs to that equation are seatbelt violation + sharpened pencil.
The "independent dangerousness" approach fares no better, however. whether a stopped suspect truly poses a danger with a pencil or a knitting needle, supporters of the independent dangerousness approach invariably invoke it with respect to the most inherently dangerous weapon of all: firearms. For example, in her Robinson dissent, Judge Harris "[n]ot only . . . reject[s] a categorical approach, particularly one aimed at guns, she also concludes that the proper Fourth Amendment approach is one that engages in an independent inquiry into whether the suspect-even one carrying a gunis dangerous." 249 According to Judge Harris, because "modern firearms law has granted substantially more legal protection to citizens as gun owners," officers "no longer may take for granted the same correlation between 'armed' and 'dangerous."' 2 50
This reasoning fails for two reasons. First, while expanding gun rights may speak to the general law abidingness of gun owners generally, they do not confer special protection to gun owners who have been lawfully stopped on suspicion of criminal activity. Terry requires officers to have first developed reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot before even reaching the question of whether or not to frisk. Those lawfully stopped suspects fairly lose the presumption of law abidingness. We should no longer take for granted the same correlation between "armed" and "dangerous" for the general Arizona population, but lawfully stopped Arizonans stand in a separate, more suspicion category.
Second, even if expanding gun rights laws force us to reexamine the correlation between an "armed individual" and a "dangerous individual," no law can change the inherent dangerousness of the firearm itself. Courts have repeatedly found that guns are uniquely and inherently dangerous. 
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guns are inherently dangerous; responsible gun owners treat them with great care." 2 53 Unlike baseball bats, broken bottles, and even knives and swords, firearms exist for one reason only: to inflict lethal damage to a target. They create an explosion to thrust a metal projectile at incredibly high velocities to pierce and destroy objects. They have the capacity to inflict a wider range of damage to a greater number of targets in a shorter amount of time than any other weapon, including the most dangerous knives and swords.
Perhaps most importantly in this context, well over half of the 257 Arizona police officers who have been killed in the line of duty were killed by gunfire.
2 54 One hundred forty-six Arizona officers have been killed in the line of duty by a firearm; the next closest type of death (automobile crash) claimed only twenty-five lives. 255 Exactly four Arizona officers have lost their lives on duty from stab wounds. 25 6 For these reasons, a modified categorical approach authorizing automatic frisks of firearms carriers only appears to best balance the rights of armed Arizonans with the needs and safety of officers and the surrounding community. On the one hand, armed Arizonans can freely carry concealed firearms in public without fear of unnecessary scrutiny by law enforcement, unless they engage in suspicious behavior independent of firearms possession sufficient to warrant an involuntarily detention. But once that detention occurs, the presumption of law abidingness disappears, and the balance of protection shifts to the officer and the immediately surrounding public to neutralize any possible threat posed by a firearm in the hands of a lawfully stopped suspect.
Such a "firearms exception" to Fourth Amendment search law necessarily means that knives, no matter how dangerous, would be subject to an independent dangerousness inquiry. One might find this approach strange, given the destructive potential of exotic blades like swords and the fact that federal sentencing guidelines include "knives" in the definition of inherently dangerous instrumentalities. But the simple reality is that knives do not carry the immediate destructive power of firearms, nor do they have the range of potential lethality that handguns and semi-automatic weapons carry. Therefore, while recognizing the inherent dangerousness of the firearm and its destructive power may counsel in favor of an automatic frisk, the same argument does not necessarily extend to knives. Another way to conceptualize this "independent dangerousness" inquiry approach is as a common tort law risk assessment. The Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by Terry and its progeny, require officers to make a fact-based determination about a suspect's potential dangerousness.
2 57 This inexact science, conducted in a short timeframe under often tense conditions, essentially requires officers to assess the amount of risk a suspect poses and determine whether that risk requires the precaution of a search.
2 58 Put another way, does the probability of harm (P) caused by the armed suspect combined with the potential magnitude of that harm (L) justify the taking of the precaution (B) of a protective frisk? As with all officer-suspect encounters, the inputs in each circumstance will be highly fact-and context-specific. But in a lawfully, heavily armed state like Arizona, the default probability that an armed Arizonan will harm a police officer should be low. Of course, that probability may increase for lawfully stopped individuals suspected of criminal behavior, and may increase dramatically if the individual is suspected of a violent crime as compared to a minor traffic violation.
The input that will change most significantly based solely on the type of "weapon" at issue is the magnitude of harm variable. Even if two Arizonans are lawfully stopped on the same street on suspicion of jaywalking and pose equally low danger profiles, the one armed with a handgun inherently poses a far greater and more immediate danger to the officer and the surrounding public than does the one armed with a switchblade. Thus, this risk assessment approach to Terry frisks further confirms the reasonableness of a modified categorical approach for firearms and an individualized assessment approach for all other weapons, including knives.
Like much of the country, Arizona has chosen to significantly expand gun and other weapon possession rights in the public square. Not surprisingly, the number of Arizonans carrying weapons in public has significantly increased as a result. Whether this widespread open and concealed carry of weapons makes Arizonans safer is a matter of significant empirical debate. Whether public carry of firearms is protected by the Arizona Constitution or United States Constitution remains an unresolved legal issue. But it is indisputable that the arming of Arizona has complicated the job of Arizona's law enforcement and fundamentally changed the legal standards governing police authority to conduct a stop and frisk.
The foregoing discussion highlights the need for Arizona's police officers to recognize that public possession of a firearm or other weapon, standing alone, no longer satisfies the Fourth Amendment's "reasonable suspicion" standard. The legalization of public carry has eliminated any viable argument that weapons possession by itself implicates criminal activity. Moreover, as the Arizona Supreme Court correctly concluded in State v. Serna, the absence of such suspicion precludes the lawful frisking or disarming of an individual carrying weapons in public purely out of concern for public safety. This increased zone of protection for armed Arizonans from involuntary police interaction changes over half a century of "stop and frisk" practice and jurisprudence and requires a recalculation of risk assessment and reasonable suspicion.
But this zone of protection fades once an armed Arizonan reasonably falls under suspicion of criminal activity. At that point, no presumption of law abidingness remains and officers can and should take all necessary precautions to protect themselves and the surrounding public. In the case of firearms possession, risk assessment principles require an automatic frisk and disarmament when doing so is practicable and enhances safety. For other weapons, including bladed weapons uniquely protected in Arizona, officers should carefully assess the utility of conducting a frisk in light of Terry's narrow original goal of officer and public protection. This careful balancing of Terry's two-pronged test-greater protections for armed Arizonans from investigatory seizures but fewer protections from protective searches-both accords with existing Fourth Amendment principles and balances the expanding rights of armed civilians with the needs of officers protecting those same civilians.
